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Being as Communication: An Exploratory Model 
Johan Siebers (Middlesex University London) 
 
Mystical experience has a generic relevance to communication. Craig (1999), in passing, 
indicated the potential relevance for communication theory of a reflection on religious and 
mystical experience; in Simonson, García-Jiménez, Siebers and Craig (2012) I sketched an 
initial exploration along the lines of thinking about communication in its non-conceptual 
dimensions as event. In this paper, I want to address the potential of the idea of a 
communication model in thinking about communication and (or as) mystical experience. The 
model presented here, then, aims to provide some coordinates for exploring this generic 
relevance. Some preliminary marks about mystical experiences, the traditions I draw upon 
and the nature of models in communication theory precede the description of the model. In 
contrast with standard academic articles, I have found it most expedient to be brief and have 
therefore condensed the model into a series of linked theses. These can be used as exploratory 
devices in a range of communication situations, much in the same way as, for example, the 
transactional model can be applied to concrete communicative practices. The model, like 
others, does not claim exclusiveness or even universality; all it does is provide some handles 
to articulate certain aspects of communication as a process and as an experience that 
sometimes appear as elusive as they appear insistent. The model can be further elaborated, 
brought into relation with other models and theories, critiqued, transformed and amended. 
It will be useful to make a distinction between two types of models: abstractive and 
sublimative. An abstractive model is an abstract representation of certain elements and 
structural features of a phenomenon, usually but not necessarily in a graphic format, which 
aids analytic understanding of the phenomenon in question. The Shannon-Weaver 
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transactional model of communication which includes the notions of a sender, receiver, 
message, code, encoder, decoder, channel or medium and noise, is a clear example. A 
sublimative model starts from the meaning of model that we encounter in phrases like “a 
model of beauty”, or “a model case” of this or that. Model here means an exemplary instance. 
These “models” articulate an intensity of realisation, a paradigm or ideal case, or the full 
realisation of the thing they model. In this sense, for example, Th. W. Adorno spoke of 
models of freedom in his Negative Dialectics (Adorno, 1969). An example in communication 
theory is Buber’s dialogical I-Thou model. I and Thou (Buber, 2004), first published in 1923, 
is an attempt to articulate what communication between people (and between people and God) 
in its full realisation is; it argues that the I-Thou relation has to be understood in its own terms, 
and that it provides the basis for other, less fully developed communicative relations (I-It 
relations) to be possible. I-Thou is not the rare, if ever achievable, perfect instance of 
communication, but rather the always present, but often only partially acknowledged, ground 
of all communication.  But as such it functions as an ideal; it can be used as goal and as a 
measure of critique; it can also be used as background against which to appreciate the many 
forms of communication, as they are all united by reference the intersubjective, non-
objectifiable relation. The I-Thou relation, finally, allows us to understand the mediality of 
communication (e.g. language) not as an external code but as the way in which the free 
encounter between I and Thou actualises itself. A sublimative model tells us what 
communication, from a particular perspective of set of interests, is all about. An abstractive 
model gives us a handle on the mechanics of the communicative process. These two models 
do not exclude each other but they do move in different registers – we might say the 
abstractive model uses concepts of the understanding (a sender, a receiver, whichever they 
are; a code, whichever it is), while the sublimative model uses ideas of reason (the free 
encounter, what it ideally amounts to).  
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The strength of a model lies in two factors mainly: the reach of its applicability or 
interpretability and the coherence of its basic notions. Coherence is here defined by reference 
to A.N. Whitehead, as meaning “that the fundamental ideas in terms of which the scheme is 
developed, presuppose each other so that in isolation they are meaningless. This requirement 
does not mean that they are definable in terms of each other; it means that what is indefinable 
in one such notion cannot be abstracted from its relevance to the other notions” (Whitehead, 
1978, p. 3). Coherence renders the model unified and ensures that as a whole it predicates 
more than each of the constituent parts taken in isolation. When coherence obtains, a model 
has an organic quality and is a functional whole. Coherence is a requirement of both 
abstrctive and sublimative models. The Shannon-Weaver model is a good example: each of 
its constituent notions cannot be separated from the others, yet there is something in each of 
them that is not simply definable in terms of the others, as a moment of reflection will show 
to everyone. Also the I-Thou model satisfies the condition of coherence to have no arbitrary 
bifurcations or unmediated dualisms in that I and Thou are distinct aspects of the 
intersubjective relation, presupposing each other but not definable in terms of each other (“I” 
do not exist outside of the I-Thou relation, but I am not simply the other of Thou). The model 
presented here also aims to satisfy this condition of coherence. 
Finally, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the difference between models and theories. 
These differences do not amount to watertight, mutually exclusive categories, but as a rule of 
thumb we can say that a model stands in a relation of interpretation or resemblance to what it 
models. The application of models is always analogical to some extent. Models can be part of 
theories, but theories have a wider remit than models. A theory gives an account, according to 
certain criteria of accountability (often causal) and certain trivial conditions such as logical 
coherence and non-contradiction (or a version of these; e.g. dialectical accounts will use a 
qualified version of the principle of non-contradiction while formal theories require more 
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stringent conditions of univocity of their concepts than non-formal theories). Without these 
parameters, theoreticality is compromised or lessened, and other forms of discourse take over. 
A model can be part of a theory, as I said, but it does not have to be, as its basic notions can 
have a non-theoretical basis in understanding. Thus the relation between Romeo and Juliet as 
a model of consuming love is not part of a theory, but of a play. But it can be used (in its 
relevant contexts) in much the same way as the Shannon-Weaver model. One way of 
articulating the porous boundary between theory and models is to point out that both, as 
ideals, seek the kind of coherence defined above. 
The concept of mystical experience is not clearly defined, and perhaps not clearly definable 
at all. Yet the experience itself is a recurrent feature of human consciousness throughout 
history and across cultures and religious and philosophical traditions. The aspect that interests 
me most here is that of a direct, intuitive grasp of the undifferentiated oneness that pervades 
all being, and which often involves a breaking or loosening of ego-boundaries in which, in 
one sense or another, a fusion with a totality is experienced. This experience is usually seen 
as lying beyond concepts and words because these divide up the whole and cannot by 
themselves stick it back together again. It is essentially intuitive and therefore has the quality, 
once it is experienced, of being self-evident.  
As we are dealing here with an experience and not a concept or idea, it will be useful to list 
three sources here by way of indicating what we are talking about, without (vainly) trying to 
make it discursively accessible, thus creating a false semblance of some conceptual or logical 
grounding of something that essentially goes against that operation. The reader has to do 
some work here, too: 
In 1934, Carl Gustav Jung, in his foreword to Daisetz T. Suzuki’s An 
Introduction to Zen Buddhism, described Ch’an (Zen –JS) as a process 
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transforming the limited ego-form self into the unlimited non-ego-
form self. When one embraces an insight into the nature of one’s self, 
emancipation from the illusory conception of self takes place and total 
consciousness emerges. This new, total consciousness is distinguished 
from the ego-form consciousness in that the latter is always conscious 
of something, whereas the former takes no object but itself. It is as if 
the subject character of the ego has disappeared, leaving this total 
consciousness conscious of itself. It is free from attachment to things, 
creatures, and circumstances. By this turning inward, man glimpses a 
total exhibition of potential nature. This realization may be illustrated 
by the words of Hsüan-sha Shih-pei. A disciple once asked him how 
he could enter Ch’an. He answered, “Do you hear the murmuring of 
the stream?” “Yes.” “Therein you may enter.” (…) William Barrett 
(…) calls this consciousness Radical Intuitionism. Intuition is an 
activity, but one without either subject or object. It is our most unified 
state of consciousness, or pure experience. When it is in action, artists 
gain new inspiration, scientists make new breakthroughs and 
discoveries and religious devotees acquire new vision. (Chang Chung-
Yuan, 1971, p. viii) 
At the base of thought there is always concealed a certain mystical 
element; even a geometrical axiom is a thing of this kind. Usually we 
say that thought can explain but intuition cannot, yet explanation 
means nothing more than being able to reduce to an even more basic 
intuition. (Kitaro Nishida, quoted in Chang Chung-Yuan, 1971, p. ix). 
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When the word “proof” has been uttered, the next notion to enter the 
mind is “half-heartedness”. Unless proof has produced self-evidence 
and thereby rendered itself unnecessary, it has issued in a second-rate 
state of mind, producing action devoid of understanding. Self-
evidence is the basic fact on which all greatness supports itself. But 
“proof” is one of the routes by which self-evidence is often obtained. 
As an example of this doctrine, in philosophical writings proof should 
be at a minimum. The whole effort should be to display the self-
evidence of basic truths, concerning the nature of things and their 
connection. (…) Philosophy is the criticism of abstractions which 
govern special modes of thought. (Whitehead, 1938, p. 66-67) 
These lengthy citations indicate the experience the model of being as communication seeks to 
articulate. I include them here not as steps in an argument but as the data the model starts 
with. I will return to the story of Hsüan-sha Shih-pei below when introducing the dimension 
of communication that is part of the mystical experience. Here I want to note that, in these 
citations, we are introduced to the idea that the radical intuitionism of mysticism is 
experiential and that this radical intuitionism lies at the basis of rational thought, which is 
always in a relation to it. As in Bergson’s notion of intuition, the conceptualising intellect 
does not reach reality as such but our consciousness is capable of placing itself within the 
process of the real, precisely as pre-predicative intuition. Our intuitions, are, however, often 
dim and they require critique as much as they provide the basis for it. They share in the 
general quality of experience of being on the one had hard fact, and on the other open to and 
in need of questioning and exploration. Pointing out the basis of thought in intuition and self-
evidence is quite the opposite of postulating privileged access to absolute knowledge. 
Empirical science and mystical experience share more with each other than with the claims of 
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religious totalitarianism, esoteric knowledge or absolute idealism. They both start from a fact 
that also seems self-evident: as knowers, we question. Even radical intuitionism, and with it – 
if we come to interpret at such – the universal oneness of which we are part, comes to light 
itself only for the questioning mind. A creative openness seems to be an intrinsic part at least 
of our relation to reality as such, if not co-extensive with it in some sense that is yet to be 
explained.  
A disciple once asked Hsüan-sha Shih-pei how he could enter Ch’an. He answered, “Do you 
hear the murmuring of the stream?” “Yes.” “Therein you may enter.” In this short koan-like 
story the starting point is easily overlooked. It is the questioning mind. How do I enter Ch’an, 
active meditation, or enlightened consciousness co-extensive with what is? That is where the 
process of entering the stream starts. The response to this question, the basic question of 
philosophy as Whitehead talks about it in the citation above, is a further question, pointing 
out what is self-evident and not going beyond it in any way. There is no theorization, no 
conceptualization, no speculation and no dispensing of knowledge or information. The 
answer to the question. The answer is almost like a question again. Of course I hear it! What 
of it? “Therein you may enter.” An invitation, not a command. Into what? Not the stream 
itself, at least not initially. But into the hearing of it. Again the disciple is thrown back upon 
more questions: what does hearing mean? What does it mean to enter into hearing as one 
might enter into a stream? To hear is to perceive, to know in some sense. Hearing retains the 
distance between the hearer and the heard, and it requires a connecting medium that is itself 
not heard (unlike, as Plato already pointed out, sight, where the medium is what is seen). But 
entering into a stream is becoming one with it. You are carried along with it. The paradox of 
Ch’an seems to be that the subject-object distinction is overcome, without it being the case 
that there are no hearers and heards anymore, that everything would become one indistinct 
soup, philosophy’s night in which all cows are grey. The disciple’s enlightenment lies along 
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the path of coming to an insight into this paradox, and the path is itself an instance of the play 
within the real that knowledge is, because it proceeds strictly along the line of questioning 
thus exhibiting an openness that is not filled up, an emptiness or negativity that is part and 
parcel of the real. Through successive stages of questioning, blank ignorance becomes 
philosophical not-knowing and openness comes into its own. 
This is a story. It seems to me to have a profound meaning that, much like a wellspring, can 
continue to give cause for thought and contemplation, to be hauled up by the bucket of 
interpretation. Yet it does not address directly an important question, a question to which it 
nevertheless may give rise precisely by remaining silent about it. This is the question of being. 
The interrelated world the story indicates, in which everything depends on everything else 
and independence is itself a relative factor within relatedness, not something that exists 
absolutely outside of it, is at first sight simply the universe of things and experiences, the 
interconnected web of life. Everything is related to everything else.  What, however, about 
the being of this world as such? What does it mean to be as such, not to be this or that entity-
in-relation? Why is there something at all, and not nothing? We are dealing here with two 
questions, or two levels of questioning, which Heidegger distinguished with the help of the 
idea of ontological difference. The level of questioning at which interrelatedness becomes 
apparent is ontic, it concerns the nature of all that there is insofar as it is. The second level is 
ontological, it concerns the question what it means to be, not to be nothing (White, 2014, p. 
133-180) 
If we look closely, we can see that the story carries this ontological difference within itself. 
At the ontic level we find the stream, its sound and the hearing of it, the two people 
interacting. At the ontological level, the story itself is a stream, something is gradually 
disclosed in the time of the story that shows what the interconnectedness of the situation that 
is described means. The universe is an interrelated web. At the higher level, this “is” shows 
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itself as a giving to be known, to us who are reading and thinking about the story. Self-
evidence repeats itself, first at the level at which the student monk comes to realise the path 
he is on, secondly as the self-giving to knowledge of being. Not only is all that is interrelated, 
being as such is relational in its standing out to being known.  
We can find clear parallels to these ideas in the Western philosophical tradition, and not only 
with the arrival of Heidegger. The Parmenidean identity of being and thinking, which can be 
traced through history via the scholastic principle that to be simply means to be knowable (if 
not by man then by God) to Hegel’s equation of the real with the reasonable and the 
pragmatist equation of reality with intelligibility indicates an awareness of the ontological 
level, even if, as is well-known, Heidegger argued that the metaphysical tradition again and 
again succumbed to the temptation to conflate the ontic and the ontological. The idea that the 
interrelatedness of beings is not something contingent but grounded in their being as such 
was given a classical formulation by Plato (which also serves as a good example of the 
procedure of self-evidence in philosophy that Whitehead refers to): 
I suggest that anything has real being, that is so constituted as to 
possess any sort of power either to affect anything else or to be 
affected, in however a small degree, by the most insignificant agent, 
though it be only once. I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real 
things, that they are nothing but power. (Sophistes, 247e, tr. Cornford) 
This criterion has no meaning if the power is not exercised at all; it is therefore circular, 
though not in a vicious way for it is at least analytically informative. Aquinas introduces the 
explicit link to communication: “It is the nature of every actuality to communicate itself 
insofar as it is possible” (De Potentia, q. 2, a.1, tr. Norris Clark). Whitehead combines the 
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Platonic mark of being with the Thomist active propensity to communicate in a formulation 
of being as communication that is as lapidary as it is irrefutable: 
Thus the philosophic scheme should be “necessary”, in the sense of 
bearing in itself its own warrant of universality throughout all 
experience, provided that we confine ourselves to that which 
communicates with immediate matter of fact. But what does not so 
communicate is unknowable, and the unknowable is unknown; and so 
this universality defined by “communication” can suffice. (Whitehead, 
1978, p. 4) 
By pragmatically reformulating of the idea of the identity of being and thinking in terms of 
experienced communication, Whitehead’s philosophy gives us an account of the ontic as well 
as the ontological side of being as communication. Not only do all beings communicate, or 
relate; being as such, what it means to be, is communication as giving-to-be-known. The 
story of the Ch’an monks covers the same ground; in this way we have found that the 
mystical experience of radical intuition tells us something about communication in a generic 
sense. Being communicates is the first element of our model. 
Classical Thomism has charted the implications of being as communication in great detail 
(Blanchette, 2003, p. 367-476). For the purposes of our model only two points need to be 
stated explicitly. 1. There is a difference between effective or productive causality, in which 
one entity brings about another materially, and the relation of knowing, which is one of 
sensation, recognition or intellection. It seems to me that this difference is treated as an 
irreducible difference in classical metaphysics, but in Whitehead’s philosophy the difference 
is one of degree. We can understand this if we realise that both are instances of creativity, 
taken in its most generic sense as the production of novelty. In both the key feature of the 
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communicative relation is present, namely the going together of a sharing or imparting, a 
commonality of some sort, and a withholding or foreclosing, an independence of some sort. 
This is precisely the irreducible and therefore indispensable and indefinable feature of 
communication, which our philosophical reflection has aimed to make clear: communication 
is not a “merging into one” but a “being together”, which means to share or participate in 
each other, but also to remain with oneself. The model seeks to give a handle on this basic 
insight, which is presupposed by our notions of, for example, mediality and recognition rather 
than that we might explain communication by reducing it to these, and other, notions of 
communication theory. Our model shows that and how communication is an irreducible term, 
coherently relatable to others in the models and theories that make up the field of 
communication theory. 
For an abstractive understanding of the communicative relation, it will appear that the sharing 
and the withholding sides lie outside of each other. And indeed in everyday experience this is 
often the case, it not always, to some extent. But for, as I have called it, a sublimative 
understanding of the communicative relation, which our model aims to include, the classical 
metaphysical tradition has a theorem that we may profitably use. Being excludes nothing, so 
all things are in some sense. But this does not make “being” the highest genus or most 
abstract and empty concept, precisely for the same reason: because it excludes nothing. 
“Being” is not really a concept at all, but the name for a pre-predicative, unthematic 
experience of the correlate of thinking (Weissmahr, 1991). From this it follows that all things 
converge in being – insofar as they all are, they are one – but also that all things diverge in 
being – for their differences are ultimately difference in being; this is different from that. 
Classical metaphysics holds that, paradoxically, that in which things are one is also that in 
which things are different: their being. We see that the sharing and withholding of 
communication are not mutually exclusive but both are equally grounded in what it means to 
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be. Weissmahr (1991) has developed this idea in the direction of a critique of the substance-
accident scheme of Aristotelian metaphysics, which has tended to see relations as forms of 
accidental being, and argues instead that on the basis of the idea of being as that in which 
things both converge and diverge, relations hold a special ontological status. We can 
conceive of a substance-relation scheme, in which the independence of an entity and its 
relatedness are not mutually exclusive or inversely related, but in which they presuppose each 
other and as one becomes more intense, so does the other. Weissmahr gives the example of 
the differences between inorganic matter, organisms and persons (Weissmahr, 1991, p. 166). 
At the inorganic level individuality but also relatedness are both relatively indistinct. Where 
does a piece of matter begin, where does it end? And one stone is not affected much by its 
contiguity to another stone. In an organism, the functional individuality of organs as well as 
their interdependence is much more pronounced. In interpersonal relations, finally, we can 
make the experience that the more intense or worked out the relatedness of persons is, for 
example in free relations of mutual recognition, the greater their independent, free 
personhood, the substantial side of the substance-relation scheme, can be (for Christian 
theology the relation between the three persons of the Trinity is the apex of the interpersonal 
relation). We can even see a reflection of this last point in the end of the koan: “therein you 
may enter” expresses a recognition of mutual freedom and the moment in which the disciple 
becomes fully himself, at least partly in and through the recognition by the master.  The story 
progresses and we now see that this progression can be understood not only in a temporal 
sense, but also in a sublimative sense, in which being as communication leads to the insight 
that communication is essentially a free relation, in which what unites and what differentiates 
is ultimately the same. Again, this is a perspective that may add to communication theory, 
because it shows us that the dimension of freedom cannot be removed from our 
understanding of the communicative relation, and that therefore attempts to theorise 
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communication that start from relations of causal determination and information exchange 
are intrinsically limited in their explanatory power. The deep inadequacy of the Shannon-
Weaver model, despite its local utility, can be understood in this way. If defines the sender 
and the receiver purely in external terms of an effective causal relation between prior, and 
independent, existents and leaves the essential communicative dimension of recognition and 
free exchange entirely in the dark, exposing itself to incoherence of its notions. This is 
another way of pointing out its abstractive nature (which is not a flaw as long as it is 
recognised as such). Communication is a mutually overlapping sharing and withholding is 
the second element of our model. 
The communication relation is not a massif, ontologically uninterrupted unity, as we have 
seen. It seems that the way being communicates has an aspect that can perhaps be indicated 
by the notions of abundance, overflowing or generosity. Precisely because the 
communicative relation is free, what communicates cannot be simply an ontological function 
or extension of beings that links up with others; only an excess or surplus of being in the 
entities themselves can, as it were, traverse an open space and establish an encounter. Buber 
often uses the term “over against” to indicate that there is a space within which 
communication happens, and that therefore the going out of oneself to communicate with 
others has to be conceived as an essential extra, a freedom in being, without which, however, 
nothing could exist. In the classical metaphysical tradition we find indeed the notion of an 
ontological generosity by which being gives itself, which in Christian theology is equated 
with the love of God. The dimensions of essential surplus and freedom can be summed up in 
the notion of communication as gift, the sublimative case of the epistemological datum: 
Note that this expansive dynamism of the act of existence implies a 
certain ontological “generosity”, as Jacques Maritain does not hesitate 
to call it, within every real being. For the real beings of our universe 
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go out of themselves (…) and have an intrinsic tendency to share (…). 
Why this should, in fact, be so is, or should indeed be, a source of 
wonder for the metaphysician. Without it, of course, there would be 
no universe. But it seems that the ultimate reason is that it is the very 
nature of God himself to be self-communicating love (Norris Clarke, 
2001, p. 33) 
We may well feel that the localisation of the moment of spontaneous self-communication in a 
divine existent adds little to the notion of the groundlessness of being that ontological 
generosity aims at. In the koan I referred to we see the same sense of spontaneous 
communication and being going out of itself, in the image of the stream and the relation of 
hearing, and we may feel that the more anarchic, generalised idea of this spontaneity 
characterising all being equally is more true to intuition than the Thomist interpretation, but 
this is not a matter that we need to explore in detail here; the model has space for both 
avenues to be explored further. The difference hinges perhaps on an ethical moment in 
metaphysics. Is ontological generosity really possible without an aim or desire to share, as 
Norris Clarke puts it – without invoking the notion of ontological love? There is a difference 
between free, spontaneous self-giving as mere overflow, like a cup that is full might overflow, 
and the intention to communicate oneself, with another in mind already, as it were, in order to 
add to the stock of good things. Where are the boundaries between an anthropomorphism of 
the relation of recognition and an ontological claim that ens et bonum convertuntur – being 
and the good converge? How we choose to think about this question will be determined 
largely by how we choose to interpret the status of the substance-relation scheme of point two 
of our model. If we say, as the metaphysical tradition does, that the good is what is willed 
(and willing the good is love), we might develop a generalised notion of will that includes all 
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being. A further illustration from the koan literature underlines the free spontaneity of being, 
and does not exclude such a generalised notion of a will, drive or desire: 
(As I) sit quietly, doing nothing, 
Spring comes and grass grows of itself.  
(Watts, 2017, p. 43 and Capra, 1975, p. 125) 
Communication is free spontaneity; who is to exclude that the spring and the grass 
communicate with the one sitting quietly, in the model’s sublimative sense of being as 
communication? Communication is free spontaneity is the third element of our model. 
We can now sum up the model: Being communicates > Communication is a mutually 
overlapping sharing and withholding > Communication is free spontaneity. The model is an 
analogue for communication processes and is sublimative, not abstractive. It is unhelpful to 
seek to translate the model as explained here into a graphical representation, as that would 
raise the impression that we are dealing with an abstractive model. We have to think of it 
much in the same was the familiar I-Thou model. Our model is based on a reflective 
recuperation of certain aspects of mystical experience and can serve as a way of articulating 
dimensions of the communicative experience that are sometimes elusive or difficult to put 
into words; it can also serve as a reminder that communication is an irreducible notion and 
that, when we invoke it, we always invoke more than what we may be conscious of. 
Communication is a universal feature of being as such, given in intuition, infinitely open to 
exploration and creative development. Communication is not owned by anyone, but the 
intractable and uncontrollable freedom by which the spirit embodies the world and animates 
it with the paradoxical, sometimes harmonious, sometimes chaotic, togetherness beyond 
discursive thinking that mystical experience gives us access to. In communication, we go out 
of ourselves, into the groundless stream of being – and find that we float. 
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